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Summary findings
The collapse of central planning set in motion the  The countries that have benefited most from accession
reintegration of the Central European countries into the  are those that followed the path of radical liberal reform.
world  economy. The European Union, because of its  Radical liberal reform, combined with preferential access
proximity, economic weight, and policy-induced deep  to EU markets, attracted  foreign direct investment.
integration, has shaped these countries' politics and  The European Union provided an outlet initially for
economics. The process of accession to the EU-which  Central European countries'  unskilled-labor-intensive
began with the signing of the European Association  products  and more recently for skilled-labor-intensive
Agreements in 1991-has  influenced their economic  and technology-based products.
institutions, policies, and performance.  Knowledge-intensive imports from the European
Kaminski traces the emerging architecture of  Union have also contributed to industrial realignment in
commercial relations in Europe and argues that the  the Central European countries. The prospect of
accession process had its greatest impact first on capital  accession and, since 1998, unfettered access to EU
flows and later on goods flows.  markets for industrial products has given a boost to
multinationals relocating production  in these countries.
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Introduction
The  EU responded  to the collapse  of communism  in Central  Europe  by providing  aid  and
offering  preferential  arrangements  initially  solely  in terms  of market access.  The EU first
'upgraded' status  of CEECs  to that of the least developed  countries  by granting  them GSP  and
soon  thereafter  signed  -the  EA. The  EA went  well  beyond  narrowly  conceived  issues  of market
access  by opening  the  path of deep,  policy-induced  integration.  Having  recognized  that  the ultimate
goal  of CEEC  signatories  of the  EA is full  membership  in the EU,  they  have  in fact set up a
foundation  for the  accession  process.  The countries  that made  the fastest  progress  in transition-
the Czech  Republic,  Estonia,  Hungary,  Poland  and Slovenia-were already  invited in July 1997
to begin  accession  negotiations  (these  started  in March 1998),  whereas  "late" or slower
reformers-Bulgaria, Latvia,  Lithuania,  Romania  and the Slovak  Republic-joined the former  in
December  1999.'
Although  the policy-induced  integration-i.e., integration  supported  by special  agreements
extending  beyond  WTO-negotiated  arrangements-of  CEECs  into  the EU falls  into  a North-South
type  of preferential  arrangements,  it goes  much  further.  Expansion  of NAFTA  to include  Mexico
and a network  of special  agreements  tying  several  developing  countries  to the EU illustrate  a
wide array  of new forms  of North-South  integration.  The accession  process  that began  with the
EA is a distinct  preferential  arrangement.  It is more  than  a free  trade (e.g., NAFTA  with a
possible  extension  to Chile),  a customs  union (e.g., the EU and Turkey),  and even  more  than
association  agreements  implying  deeper  integration  (e.g.,  the European  Union and Mediterranean
countries)  as CEECs  are already  involved  in accession  negotiations.  The process  is similar  to that
of enlargement  of regional  agreements  through  accession,  i.e.,  the EU accession  of Greece,
Portugal  and Spain.  It implies  full convergence  of their domestic  systems  to the EU acquis
communautaire,  that is, the comprehensive  body of laws,  rules and regulations  that govern  the
Union.
Considering  the envisaged  depth  and scope,  returns usually  associated  with integration
into  a "Northern'  regional  bloc should  be high.  The most important  potential  benefit  related
uniquely  to 'policy-induced'  integration  of a poor  country  into highly  developed  economies  is
that the former  can  become  like the  latter  in terms  of economic  institutions  and policies.  Although
institution-building  takes  time, the accession  process  exerts  enormous  pressures  and creates
This  first-also including  Cyprus-is often  called  the  "Luxembourg  Group,"  whereas  the  second  is
referred to as the "Helsinki Group." The  latter also includes  Malta.4
incentive to move faster especially once accession negotiations begin. It also gives an extra
ammunition to overcome political resistance to the overhaul of old rules of economic game.
Thus, it seems that the importance of the policy-induced integration into the EU stems
mainly from the alignment of their economic systems with the EU archetype, i.e., complementary
reforms. 2 These institutional measures include among others laws on competition, company law,
company accounts and tax regulations, banking law, laws on mergers and state aid, intellectual
property law, rules of indirect taxation, transport and environment laws. 3
Enhanced credibility of commitment to liberal economic policies and improved market
access are the source of standard returns from North-South type integration to a "Southern"
partner. These usually include increased flows of trade as well as of direct and portfolio
investments as investors face lower institutional and policy risks due to improvement in a
country's business climate. For instance, the gradual adoption of the acquis has already vastly
contributed to the improvement in business climate and made CEECs more attractive to foreign
and domestic investors alike. In addition, circumventing tariffs of a "Northern" country thanks to
the free trade agreement provides an extra incentive to foreign firms to invest. The enhanced-
growth potential of a country usually results in higher growth of real GDP.
Sorting out which factors related to policy-induced integration are accountable for
policies pursued by a "southern" economy and their outcomes is always an arduous task. But it is
particularly difficult in the case of CEEC integration into the EU. For one, integration-induced
effects are impossible to separate from those stemming from dismantling central planning. The
1989-91 period witnessed rejection by CEEC societies of the political and economic system that
Stalin had imposed on them. Thus, the movement in the direction of liberal capitalism as
exercised by highly developed countries was inevitably part of the initial transition.
The shift in their commercial relations towards the EU was also bound to happen. For all
of them the EU has always been potentially both the largest trading partner and the most
important source of capital and technology. However, as long as politics had determined CEECs'
external relations, this potential could not be activated and the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance was their major partner. With the collapse of central planning, that is, once external
commerce has finally become subordinated to economic considerations and state monopoly over
2 This should  not imply  the irrelevance  of trade  component  of EAs.  The point  is rather  that  liberalization  in
conditions  of access  to markets  for commodities  without  concomitant  structural  reforms  would  only
result in exits from trade-related disciplines of EAs.
3  These institutional  and regulatory requirements are similar  to the treaty between the EU and EFTA,
establishing  in 1992  the European  Economic  Area.  In a narked  contrast,  however,  the Europe5
foreign trade was abolished, the EU has quickly emerged as their largest trading partner. This
outcome was bound to occur with or without a network of special preferential arrangements,
albeit they certainly helped CEECs' firms in marketing their products in the EU.
While initially the pace of trade reorientation towards the EU depended largely on the
pace of liberalization and the extent to which a CEEC had "undertraded" with the EU under
central planning (Kaminski, Wang and Winters, 1996), subsequently industrial realignment has
become crucial to sustainability of trade expansion. Access to FDI combined with business
climate favorable to private sector development has shaped the dynarnics of industrial
restructuring. In this way, the accession process appears to have had significant impact on
structural reforms and FDI inflows.
The effectiveness of the policy-induced integration process to lock a country in a virtuous
circle of liberalizing economic reforms hinges critically on its scope and depth as well as
punishment mechanisms for exits. At the initial stages, the EU did not seem to have had a
significant impact on reforms in CEECs for two reasons. First, the EA were devoid of incentives
to reward them for moving quickly in transition to a market-based democracy and exercise
restraint in macroeconomic management. They also offered many easy exits and, perhaps more
importantly, lacked a well-defined promise of membership.
Second, the EAs were signed after most CEECs had already launched their respective
stabilization-cum-transformation  programs. Hence, the EU could not play a direct role, albeit its
imports somehow lessened the pain of the adjustment inflicted by the collapse of CMEA import
demand and the shift towards a new economic regime. 4
At the later stages, however, the impact of the EA on economic policies of CEECs had
become more explicit. In addition to the ongoing harmonization of domestic economic
institutions and policies with those of the EU, regional liberalization of foreign trade can be
directly attributable to the EA-initiated process of accession. The trade provisions of EAs have
obliged CEECs to open their markets to EU imports and the EU have induced CEECs towards
Agreements  proscribe the free movement of labor during the first five years and, after that time, promnise
only an examination of the situation.
4There  is one caveat, however. For slow and gradual reformers, the EU factor has played a significant role
in strengthening political coalitions favoring radical economic reforms. Public fears that government
policies jeopardized prospects for accession to the EU seem to have tipped the political balance in
favor of reformers  in Bulgaria,  Romania  and Slovakia,  albeit  it remains  to be seen whether  they  will
survive the next round of parliamentary elections. New governments undertook liberal reforms and
the desire to converge to the acquis has been their guiding principle. With the move to accession
negotiations, the process has become more orderly (negotiations of chapters) and the EU's role in
shaping institutional change and policies has been expanding.6
elimination of trade barriers among themselves. In consequence, by the end of 1  990s around 80
percent of CEECs' imports of industrial products were not subject to tariffs.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 discusses the emergence of a
new pan-European framework for trade in industrial products and the twin impact of the EA-
driven integration process on foreign trade policies in CEECs and on EU foreign trade policies.
Section 2 reviews the realignment in CEECs foreign trade during transition with the emphasis on
its trade with the EU and the role of FDI in integration into the EU. Section 3 seeks to assess the
role of the policy-driven integration in attracting FDI and their impact on trade integration of
CEECs into the EU. The last section concludes.
1. Emerging  'Pan-European'  Framework  for Commercial  Interaction
The process of the policy-induced integration of CEECs into the EU, initiated by the EA,
has already led to the emergence of a single framework for trade in industrial products among
European Economic Area countries and CEECs. The framework provides for free trade in
industrial products as of January 1, 2002. Its emergence is the result of several developments all
driven by the combination of CEEC aspiration to become EU-members and EU's incremental
accommodation to CEECs pressures.
The trade component of the EA has shaped trade policies of CEECs. It committed CEEC
to remove gradually, over a period of maximum ten years, tariffs and other barriers to imports
from the EU. Since thc EU, because of its proximity and huge size in terms of GDP has always
been potentially (i.e., once CEECs become "ordinary" market economies) the largest trading
partner for CEECs, liberalization in market access for EU suppliers amounted to a dramatic
increase in competition from imports in CEECs. With the extension of similar arrangements to
EFTA and other CEEC economies, the proportion of trade subject to preferential treatment has
further increased.
The proliferation of EAs has set the EU on the path towards establishing a single trading
area in industrial products. First, in order to stimulate trade among CEECs aspiring to become EU
members, the European Commission prodded them to sign bilateral free trade agreements for
industrial products. Second, complications created by the emergence of a network of overlapping
free trade areas around the EU pushed the European Commission to seek harmonization rules of
origin among European partners of EU-inspired FTAs. The major outcome of these two
developments will be a single free trade area (to be fully in place on January 1, 2002) in industrial
products linked through a system of diagonal cumulation (WTO 1997).7
1.1.  "EU factor"  in foreign  trade policies  of CEECs
Initially both the approach to economic reforms and accession to the EU shaped foreign
trade institutions and policies of CEEC economies. The two had reinforced each other, but only
for these countries that took the radical approach to economic reforms. Then, the process of
institutional alignment with the requirements of the acquis served as a basis for domestic
transition in CEEC countries towards a market based economy. With the progress in the
integration process and harmonization of economic regimes with the acquis, integration
framework's impact on foreign trade institutions and policies has increased. So has its impact on
contestability of domestic markets, as the process compelled CEECs to open their markets to
competition from preferential partners.
As a matter of economic logic, the best policy choice for a country is to integrate fully
into the global economy. But a special relationship with certain developed countries may increase
international competitiveness and yield welfare enhancing benefits to a developing country. There
is no conflict between regional integration and unilateral liberalization. In fact, benefits from
regional arrangements may be even larger when supported by unilateral liberalization and deeper
integration. It has been shown that the combination of integrationist arrangements with developed
countries and unilateral trade liberalization increase these benefits even further.
Regional liberalization
Regional agreements with the EU were clearly the most attractive policy option to
CEECs. Because of its size and geographical proximity, the EU is their largest trading partner-
both as a potential huge importer as well as supplier of knowledge-intensive products. Thus,
liberalization in conditions of market access for EU firms has dramatically increased competition
from imports to CEEC domestic producers as well as availability of high quality products to
consumers. 5
But the EA's trade component per se could not assure the emergence of a good trade
regime, that is, one that would tame special interests of politicians and import-competing sectors,
which is a litmus test for the quality of foreign trade institutions and policies. Its provisions aimed
mainly at areas affecting market access and trade between CEECs and the EU. But even in these
areas they suffered from two weaknesses: First, they would not infringe unless there was
deterioration in market access for EU firms. For instance, highly disruptive administrative
5 Opening  to the EU  has increased  the capacity  of CEEC  firms  to compete  in international  markets.  Note
that  several  studies  show  that  new products  of higher  quality  have  been  behind  the expansion  of
CEECs  exports to the EU. See, for instance, Djankov and Hoekman (1997), Barba Navaretti et al.
(2000).8
practice of discretionary tariff exemptions was allowed to persevere. Second, they offered CEECs
the exit option through various safeguards allowing for a temporary suspension of disciplines.
Yet, CEECs-except  for Poland-have  rarely resorted to safeguards. Hence, neither of these two
weaknesses had a serious negative impact on CEECs' foreign trade regime vis-a-vis the EU.
The impact of accession was initially the largest on tariff policy, as the EA and
subsequent amendments obliged CEECs to remove tariffs on industrial products over a period of
ten years. First, the EA initially "froze" tariff rates of CEEC imports from the EU by adopting the
standstill principle. Once the Interim Trade Provisions of the EA went into effect neither new
duties nor any other charges with similar effects could be implemented. Second, CEEC zeroed
tariff rates on around 30 percent of Combined Nomenclature items upon the entry in force of EA
trade provisions. Third, for the remaining industrial products there were different schedules
gradually lowering tariffs. In 2000 around 90 percent of CEEC industrial imports from the EU
were not subject to tariffs. Tariffs will be fully removed by 2002.
But the accession process has also shaped CEECs' foreign trade policies with each other
as well as other trading partners. Not unlike the EU in its foreign trade policy, each CEEC had
become enmeshed in a web of bilateral FTAs. Two kinds of FTAs can be distinguished: those
signed among CEECs themselves and preferred partners of the EU with EFTA at the top, and, on
the other hand, these signed by CEECs with "non-accession" partners. The distinction is
important foT  two reasons: because of negafive implications that CEEC accession to the EU may
have on their trade with "non-accession" countries, and because the forrner agreements set the
groundwork for smooth accession to the EU, albeit with a caveat. 6
As for the first kind of FTAs, i.e., among preferred European partners of the EU, the
EFTA countries signed the preferential trade agreements with CEECs on average within a year
after the EA had gone into effect. The preferential trade agreements with EFTA were modeled
after the EA. The first preferential agreement among CEECs was CEFTA, which entered into
force in 1993.  Its membership gradually expanded over time.' Baltic states signed FTA among
themselves in 1995. There were also other bilateral agreements with countries that have
6 The caveat  is that  FTAs signed  among  CEECs  usually  have more  liberal  foreign  trade  regime  for
agricultural  products  than that of the EU, although  additional  agreements  on trade in agricultural
products  signed  with  the EU  in 1999-2000  have  been closing  the gap.  Yet,  different  dates  of accession
to the EU may  create  conflicts  among  CEECs  left behind  unless  CAP is overhauled.
The CEFTA  signed  in 1992,  provides  a framework  for  bilateral  agreements  among  seven  states:  the Czech
Republic,  Hungary,  Poland,  Slovakia,  Slovenia  (which  acceded  in 1996)  and Romania  (which
acceded  in July 1997).  More  precisely,  the CEFTA  system  has two components:  a multilateral  and
bilateral.  A multilateral  component  comprises  conmmonly  agreed  preferences,  whereas  a bilateral  one
those  negotiated  bilaterally  and not extended  to all CEFTA  members.9
preferential arrangements with the EU. Most CEECs either have or are about to sign FTAs with
such EU preferential partners as Turkey, Israel, and Morocco.
As for the second type of agreements, a number of CEECs concluded FTAs with
"outsiders." For instance, Slovenia has FTA with Croatia and Bulgaria with Macedonia. Although
the status of these FTAs is unclear upon CEEC accession to the EU, "outsiders" may become
included into the EU expansion scheme. For instance, the EC has included Albania, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Croatia, and Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in the so-called Stabilization
and Association Process specifically designed for Western Balkan countries. The EC has recently
accorded these countries preferential access for most tariff line to EU markets. 8 Hence, CEECs'
FTAs with these countries are not likely to complicate their commerce once they become
members of the EU and adopt EU's common external tariffs.
Reverse discrimination
Although contestability of CEECs' domestic markets has significantly increased as a
result of regional liberalization, trade diversion due to growth in discrimination against MFN
imports was likely to occur. Reverse discrimination, i.e., the difference between MFN and
preferential rates has increased while conditions in market access for preferential supplies have
improved. In 1999 around 85 percent of all industrial imports were duty free and this percentage
will increase with the removal of all tariffs on industrial imports in 2002. Although CEECs have
reduced tariff rates under the Uruguay Round Agreements, for most of them the fa]l in
preferential rates was steeper than in MFN rates indicating an increase in the levels of reverse
discrimination. The fall in the share of MFN suppliers in industrial imports of CEECs from 100
percent in 1991 to around 10-15  percent can be attributable to some degree to trade diversion.
While its scope has been rather limited because of the economic size of the EU and geographical
proximity among CEECs, it would have been considerably lower had CEECs lowered their MFN
tariffs on industrial products to EU's applied MFN tariff rates.
But this has not happened so far. Although almost all CEECs have MFN tariff rates on
industrial products significantly higher than the EU, not a single CEEC has sought to align them
with the tariff rates in the EU (Kaminski 1999). With two exceptions of the Czech and Slovak
Customs Union and Estonia, their MFN rates on industrial products remain significantly larger
s The Europe  Council  Regulation  No. 2007/2000  (18 September  2000)  has considerably  widened  trade
preferences  already  applied  by removing  the remaining  tariff  ceilings  for industrial  products  and by
improving  conditions  in access  to EU  markets  for agricultural  products.  It was  reported  that identical
preferences  the EU would  grant  soon  to FYR  Macedonia  (Agence  Europe,  Brussels,  20 September
2000).10
than in the EU. But only in Estonia free trade regime has been the outcome of strong free trade
sentiments among political elite. The former Czechoslovakia, a founding member of GATT,
inherited low MFN rates from tariff concessions made earlier by its communist regime in GATT
multilateral trade negotiations. These were irrelevant then as a central plan rather than
independent traders determined imports.
Concluding comment
It is rather odd that other CEECs have not aligned their MFN applied tariff schedule on
industrial imports with that of the EU. Consider that such a move would make economic sense
without triggering political opposition. For one, there is a strong 'reverse discrimination'
argument in favor of adopting EU MFN applied rates as victims of reverse discrimination are not
only MFN suppliers but also domestic users of imports-consumers  and producers alike. 9 Second,
there is no compelling political economy argument against alignment of tariffs as CEECs have
already either lowered or eliminated tariff rates on industrial imports from the EU in accordance
with the provisions of the EA. Since most domestic  producers of industrial goods are already
exposed to tariff-free competition  from EU imports, the alignment of MFN tariff rates with those in
the EU would encounter little, if any domestic opposition. Furthermore,  the 'bargaining' argument
vis-a-vis other WTO members does not apply, as the move would not affect negotiated MFN tariff
rates. These would remain at the same level, whereas lower EU rates would be applied unilaterally.
Given this revealed reluctance to engage in multilateral liberalization, one may conclude
that the levels of opening of CEEC markets to external competition would have been
considerably lower in the absence of the EA-driven process of European integration. The
protectionist impulses of economic bureaucracies in many CEECs seem to have been contained
by the imperative of accession and fears of retaliatory measures by the Commission, albeit not
always and not fully. Without the imperative of regional liberalization in the context of EU
accession, competition from imports in most CEECs would have been much weaker with
significant losses in terrns of microeconomic efficiency and consumer welfare. This  seems to be
a very important  gain  from the accession  process.
9 High  preferential  margins increase  the potential  for trade  diversion  often  to more  expensive  suppliers  in the
EU.  They  seem  to have  been  the main  beneficiaries  of this  provision,  as high  tariff  rates  kept cormpetitors
from  non-EU  countries  at disadvantage.I1
1.2. CEEC  Factor  in EU trade  policy:  towards  a new  pan-European  commercial  setting
While there is a large body of literature on political and economic aspects of
adjustment, 10 the fact that the policy-induced integration of CEECs into the EU has produced a
new institutional framework of European relations remains largely unnoticed. The framework is
the result of the evolution of EU trade policy driven in large part by its desire to accommodate
accession aspirations of CEECs. More specifically, it can be regarded as the response of the EU
to complications created by the emergence of a network of overlapping free trade areas and the
need to harmonize rules of origin among European members of EU-inspired FTAs. The process
had two components: harmonization in liberalization of trade in industrial products and
"regionalization" of rules of origin. Its maj  or outcome will be a single free trade area (to be fully
in place on January 1, 2002) in industrial products linked through a system of diagonal
cumulation (WTO 1997).
Although trade components of EAs with some CEECs went into effect on different dates
ranging from 1992 (former Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland) to 1996 (Slovenia), schedules
of elimination of duties and NTBs on industrial products had one important component in
common. They all had January 1, 2002 as the date to complete the process of liberalization.
Similarly, elimination of duties on industrial products did not go beyond these dates in all other
bilateral free trade agreements signed among CEECs. In consequence, the pace of liberalization
has been harmonized in terms of the date of the emergence of a pan-European free trade area in
industrial products.
"Regionalization" of the rules of origin has gone through more complex process. The
FTAs are usually bilateral agreements envisaging the establishment of free trade area between
two or more countries and providing for bilateral cumulation of origin between parties of the
FTA. FTAs have to specify conditions that products must meet in order to take advantage of
preferential treatment. If "outside" imports embodied in a product exported to another partner of
the FTA exceed a certain threshold, this product is subject there to MFN rather then preferential
tariffs. This arrangement is more advantageous to a larger partner in the FTA, as its firms can
draw upon a larger pool of local inputs.
The EA initially did not diverge from this practice. They were bilateral agreements
between a CEEC and the EU. By the same token, imports from say Hungary processed in Poland
but not in the extent to meet the EA rule of origin criterion and exported to the EU were treated as
10  The semninal  study  is Baldwin,  Francois  and  Portes.  (1997).12
"external"  imports.'"  Since  the EU is larger  than any single  CEEC  or their aggregate,  this
arrangement  was  clearly  more advantageous  to firms  from the EU than for firms from a CEEC,
albeit  with a caveat.  It prevented  large  MNCs  from  establishing  production  networks  across
CEECs.
The sheer  number  of FTAs with CEECs  further  exacerbated  problems  and reduced
potential  benefits  to transition  economies.  Because  of the European  Economic  Area establishing
the common  market  for EU and EFTA  countries,  the latter  had little choice  but to negotiate  free
trade agreements  with CEEC.  These  were modeled  after the EA, as EFTA  firms wanted  to enjoy
the same  access  to CEEC  markets  as firms from  the EU in order  to compete  with then  on equal
footing.  Both the EA and FTAs of EFTA  with each CEEC  had very similar  rules for determining
whether  a product  would  qualify  for preferential  treatment.  They  provided  for bilateral
cumulation  of origin  between  the EU or EFTA  and the  beneficiary  CEEC.
While  the EU- and EFTA-CEEC  FTA rules of origin  were a carbon  copy  of arrangements
between  the EU and EFTA,  their practical  implications  were  different  for CEEC-firms.  Consider
first that EU-EFTA  arrangement,  i.e., the European  Economic  Area, was different  from EA. The
former  was based on a bilateral  cumulation  between  the EU and EFTA as a whole  rather than
each CEEC,  whereas  the latter  on bilateral  cumulation  between  the EU and each CEEC.
Similarly,  FTAs  between  EFTA  and each  CEEC  were  based on the same  rule.
Second,  although  both the EA and FTAs with EFTA  facilitated  commercial  interaction,
their major  beneficiaries  were firms from  the EU and to a lesser  extent from EFTA,  as the latter
was a much  smaller  economy  in aggregate.  The EA have  thus led to the emergence  of the so-
called  hub-and-spoke  pattern putting  spoke  (CEEC)  firms' at a disadvantage  vis-a-vis  hub (EU or
EFTA)  firms  (Baldwin  1994).  The latter  could  use inputs  originating  in either other  EU- or other
EFTA-member  countries  to qualify  for preferences,  whereas  the forner could  not use imports
from EFTA  or other  CEEC(s)  to qualify  for preferences  in the EU. Similarly,  CEEC  firms could
not use inputs  from EU firms  to qualify  for preferences  in EFTA  markets.  12 Since  the industrial
base of either  the EU or EFTA  is dramatically  larger  than  in any of a single  CEEC,  this
Because of asymmetry in respective schedules of tariff reductions by the EU and CEEC, the advantage
of EU/EFTA fimns  was eroded until around 1997 when CEEC tariff reductions on EU industrial
imports became meaningful.
12  Rules varied depending on a product. Preference was granted to textiles if it was produced in a free trade
area from fabric also originating in a free trade area. For rnachines, a 70 percent value-added rule
applied or 60 percent with an additional condition that all imports from outside would undergo a
change to the tariff position of the machine according to the HS (Harmonized System). Since specific
parts were generally classified in the same heading of the HS as the machines in which they were
merged, this condition was rarely met (Nell 1997).13
arrangement has offered strong advantage to EU/EFTA firms at the expense of CEEC firms. It
was easier for the former to claim preferences in access to CEEC markets.
Third, bilateral cumulation of rules of origin in CEECs' FTAs with the EU and EFTA
created disincentives to use inputs originating in separate free trade areas, which reduced
potential advantages enjoyed by EU firms and, ironically, it further depressed benefits of EA to
CEECs. These arrangements erected a barrier to the development of trade based on fragmentation
of production, i.e., moving across border various fragments of a supply chain, which has been the
most dynamic component of international trade over the last decade (Feenstra 1998). For
instance, a machine tool produced by a Swiss firm using parts originating in CEECs would not
qualify for duty-free access in EU markets. And the same Swiss machine using inputs originating
in EU might not qualify for preferential access to CEEC markets, as EU parts were considered as
third-country material.
Hence, the rush to establish FTAs with CEEC produced the partition of Europe in terms
of commerce, which-although  organized around the EU-was  detrimental to interest of EU
businesses as well as those in EFTA and CEEC economies. Many EU and EFTA firms have been
in various vertical and horizontal production arrangements for a long time. Their joint products
would not qualify for preferential treatment in CEEC markets. Furthermore, EU firms interested
in either outsourcing or moving various stages of production to different CEEC would face the
prospect of paying duties on their import into the EU. Nell (1997) notes that the system had
become so messy that Western European industry supported measures that would eliminate
obstacles to trading across preferential zones.
Attempts to address these deficiencies had led first to CEEC acceptance of new rules of
origin based on the rules applied in European Economic Area linking EU and EFTA countries.
With the establishment of CEFTA, these rules were extended to three Visegrid countries (former
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland). Trade with these countries thus became based on diagonal
cumulation of origin with a single trading zone having had replaced three separate zones each
having bilateral ties with the EU. Instead of extending the rule of diagonal cumulation to all
CEECs and the EEA,' 3 the European Commission requested that CEECs sign FTAs among
themselves and the EU Council adopted the so-called pan-European cumulation program in July
1996. The program envisaged signing of the pan-European Cumulation Agreement that would
'3  After  the establishment  of CEFTA  by these  three  countries  in 1992,  the European  Conmmission
introduced  diagonal  cumulation  allowing  for the use of inputs  originating  in any CEFTA  member  to
qualify  for preferences.  In 1996  only  the Czech  Republic,  Hungary,  Poland  and Slovak  Republic  had
diagonal  arrangement  with  the EU. The remaining  six-CEECs  had arrangements  based on the
principle  of bilateral  cumulation.14
link CEECs and European Economic Area countries through a system of diagonal cumulation
allowing imports in these countries to be treated as local inputs (WTO 1997).
The Pan-European Cumulation Agreement, which went into effect on January 1, 1997,
has set the stage for formation of a single European trading bloc. In addition to extending rules of
origin to all European associates of the EU, it has also standardized trade components of EA as
well as newly signed agreements in terms of the date of removal of tariffs and non-tariff barriers
by the end of 2001. In consequence, a single pan-European trading zone will become in 2002 a
free trade zone for industrial products encompassing 29 countries.' 4
This arrangement has two major advantages. First, with or without quick EU
membership, CEEC exporters already have preferential access to industrial product markets
encompassing around 490 million consumers. Second, the Agreement strongly encourages the
development of assembly operations, outward processing, outsourcing and transfer of production
facilities within the enlarged area. This is particularly important in such production and marketing
networks as telecommunication, audio-visual and automobile production where these are already
conducted on a significant scale. Another potential beneficiary is outward processing in the
textiles and clothing (WTO 1997:61).
Hence, in retrospect, the interim trade component of the EA has turned out to be more
important than anybody might anticipate when it went into effect in March 1992. It was a
beginning point of a process that has set a new framework providing strong incentive to economic
integration within the European continent. This strikes one as a huge, even though originally
unanticipated return from regional integration, to both the EU and CEECs.
1.3. New  trade  framework  and accession
The emerging framework for free trade in industrial products encompassing 'old Western
Europe'  and ten CEECs provides a good vehicle for integration and economic growth. However,
the framework has a serious structural flaw related to the exclusion of agricultural products
further compounded by the exclusion of some European countries from the framework. The latter
may create friction between CEECs and "non-EU" associates once they become members,
whereas the former may emerge if CEECs are not admitted in a bundle to the EU.
Scattered accession may create significant economic dislocation in agricultural sectors in
countries still awaiting accession, simply because bilateral preferential trade agreements that each
CEEC has signed are more friendly towards free trade in agricultural products than the EU's
14  The countries  covered  by the framework  are Bulgaria,  the Czech  Republic,  Estonia,  Hungary,  Iceland,
Latvia,  Lithuania,  Norway,  Poland,  Romania,  the Slovak  Republic,  Slovenia,  Switzerland,  Turkey  and
15-EU  memnbers.15
Common Agricultural Policy. The extreme case would be the admission of the Czech Republic
while Slovakia is left behind. The Czech Republic would then have to adopt the EU's external
tariffs. This would not be a problem for Slovak firms producing industrial products as these
already enjoy unfettered (duty-free) access to EU markets. But the customs union agreement
between the Czech Republic and Slovakia includes also agricultural products. If Slovakia were
left behind, its farmers would loose free access to Czech markets and would have to compete on
unequal footing with subsidized EU agricultural products.
The extent to which scattered accession imposes adjustment costs on countries that would
have not been included by the European Commission in a given round of accession will depend
on the pace of lifting duties and other constraints in agricultural trade. In 2000 the EU signed
bilateral agreements with several CEECs removing tariffs on "nonsensitive" agricultural products
(e.g., vegetables, fruits, mushrooms, livestock, horse meat) and raising duty-free quotas on
"sensitive" agricultural products such as wheat, poultry, pork products and some dairy products."
This should weaken the negative impact of scattered accession.
Notwithstanding the choice of the mode of accession by the EU, the adoption of the EU
CET on all products will negatively influence other countries with which a CEEC has FTA.
Provided that agricultural trade is subject to less stringent conditions than under CAP, even a
country that has FTA with the EU will be negatively affected.
Hence, the CAP agricultural regime remains also a barrier to smooth regional integration.
Reform of the CAP and concomitant liberalization in conditions of access to EU agricultural
markets would go a long way to reduce the potential for trade conflicts in Europe. So would the
inclusion of some countries that have been so far excluded from the Pan-European single trading
bloc projects-especially  those from the former Yugoslav space.
2. Readjustment  in trade  patterns
It is an impossible task to identify with any precision the extent to which preferential
access to EU markets was responsible for reorientation in geographic patterns of trade of CEEC.
Under central planning they undertraded with the EU and overtraded with each other and other
members of the former CMEA. A sizable portion of the adjustment can be attributable to the
correction in earlier trends. Yet, although it would be impossible to put any figure on it, the
preferential access has certainly contributed to the shift towards manufactures. These products
5 Agreements, although drawn upon within the framework of EA, differ among themselves reflecting
"competitiveness" of CEECs in agricultural production. They are, however, substantive liberalizing
between half and two-thirds of countries' agricultural exports to the EU.16
have enjoyed preferential treatment in EU markets since the outset of transition. Change in
directions of trade, the composition of exports and factor content of CEEC exports capture the
scope of adjustment that CEECs underwent in the 1990s and provide important insight into
benefits from policy-induced integration with the EU.
2.1. Significance of preferential access
While the shift from a supply-constrained economic regime to a demand-constrained
regime combined with the collapse of import demand in CMEA has been the major force behind
the expansion of CEEC-EU trade, the measures introduced by the EU to support transition and
accelerate  re-integration of CEECs into EU markets  have also contributed to trade expansion.
Consider  the following. First, in the aftermath of the 1989 revolutions the EU granted GSP status-
bypassing their "state trading" qualification-first  to Hungary and Poland (1990), then to Bulgaria
and former Czechoslovakia (1991), and subsequently to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (1992).
Romania had GSP status since 1973. GSP status gave them the same conditions in access as those
enjoyed by least-developed  countries. Slovenia  retained preferential status for its exports under the
so-called  autonomous trade preferences granted by the EU to Yugoslavia in the 1980 Cooperation
Agreement.  16
The GSP status significantly improved access of exporters from CEECs to EU markets,
especially, for industrial products. GSP preferential rates embraced 63 percent of all CN tariff
lines in EU imports with most of them (94 percent of GSP items) subject to zero Tates.' 7 This
share was higher for industrial products and amounted to 74 percent with all GSP preferential
rates for these products equal zero. As a result, the share of exports with duty-free access almost
doubled from around 18 percent to about 35 percent (Kaminski 1993). Other measures including
the removal of specific quantitative restrictions and suspension of non-specific restrictions
(excluding imports of agricultural products, textiles and steel) in 1990 and 1991; the elimination
of quantitative restrictions (excluding exports to Benelux, Gernany  and Italy) on steel and iron
imports; and increases in textile and clothing quotas have also improved access for products
originating in CEECs.
Second, the interim trade component of EA overshadowed GSP arrangements by
retaining preferential tariffs and making them permanent rather than subject to annual reviews. In
16  See Trade Relations between the European Community and South Eastern Europe, Discussion  Paper,
Stability Pact: Meeting of the Economic Working Table, Brussels, 9 October 1990.
17  An important  caveat  is that  many  of these  irnports  are subject  to GSP  preferential  rates  within  limits  and
above them to MFN rates. As a result, their significance may be overstated.17
consequence, one source of uncertainty concerning future conditions in market access, which
usually negatively affects FDI inflows and other export-oriented investments, has been removed.
Hence, since at least around 1990-92  all CEEC have been close to the top of the EU
preferential pyramid. Market access in accordance with trade provisions of the EA went into
effect in 1992 for the former Czechoslovakia,  Hungary and Poland, in 1994 for Bulgaria and
Romania,  in 1995 for the Baltic States, and in 1996 for Slovenia. Countries that signed EA after
Czechoslovakia,  Hungary and Poland either enjoyed the GSP status or special preferential access as
Slovenia did under autonomous trade preferences under the 1980 agreement  between the EU and
former Yugoslavia.
As regards changes in market access for the CEECs, the major provisions--including
subsequent amendments increasing the pace of removing tariff barriers-involved  (i) full
liberalization of market access for industrial products within five years after entry in force of the
Interim Trade Agreements (ITA); (ii) elimination of quantitative restrictions on industrial
products on the date of entry into force of the ITA except for MFA-bound textiles and clothing
products, as well as products listed in the Treaty of the European Community of Coal and Steel;
(iii) granting of tariff and/or tariff and ceiling quota concessions on industrial imports following
various transition schemes; (iv) elimination of some quantitative restrictions on agricultural
imports upon entry in force of the ITA while other restrictions will be either gradually liberalized
or maintained pending the outcome of the Uruguay Round and the reform of the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP); (v) limiting the increase in agricultural imports to 10 percent in each
of the next five years; and (vi) reduction of duties on listed food products.
The schedule of the removal of barriers to imports from CEEC was accelerated. Suffice
here to note that by 1 January 1997 all duties on industrial products were abolished and on I
January 1998 all remaining quantitative restrictions (textile and clothing) on imports originating
in CEECs were dismantled (WTO 1997, p. 61).
Duty-free access gives an extra edge over competitors equal to the MFN (Most Favored
Nation) tariff rate for a given item. Admittedly, the EU has an extensive web of preferential
arrangements with a good deal of its trading partners. In consequence, a number of preferred
partners compete in EU markets with products originating in CEECs on the same footing. These
agreements, however, do not cover such formidable exporters as East Asian countries (including
China), United States, Canada, and exporters with the potential to compete in many similar
products such as states that emerged from the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Exporters from
these countries are subject to MFN treatment.18
Thus, it seems that preferential access has helped CEECs to expand their exports to the
EU and find a new niche in international division of labor organized around the EU. Interestingly,
the largest gains in exports to the EU were originally in products not subject to extensive
liberalization measures (Kawecka-Wyrzykowska 1995). While initially, i.e., over 1989-93, EU
turned out to be a very absorptive market for unskilled labor intensive manufactured goods,
skilled labor and technology intensive drove subsequently the export expansion. Most
importantly, preferential arrangements also provided an incentive to MNCs to move or establish
production facilities in CEECs. As we shall see (Section 3), foreign owned firms have been
largely responsible for the shift in some CEECs exports from unskilled labor intensive products to
skilled labor and capital intensive products.
2.2. Geographical reorientation of trade
Geographic reorientation of trade towards patterns driven by markets rather than politics
occurred relatively quickly. Since the scope and factors underlying the shift in CEEC patterns
have been extensively documented elsewhere (Brenton and Gros, 1997; Kaminski, Wang and
Winters, 1996; Landesmann, 1995; Michalopouolos, 1999, Smith, 2000), for the purpose of this
discussion two comments will suffice. First, trade linkages among CEEC contracted dramatically
following the demise of the CMEA and still remain very weak. The share of this trade increased
between 1989 and 1993 from 8 to 13 percent, but mainly because of the dissolution of
Czechoslovakia. The bulk of intra-CEEC trade takes place between the Czech Republic and
Slovakia, which until 1992 had been part of the same national economy. Combined exports from
Czech Republic and Slovakia to CEEC account for around two thirds of intra-CEEC exports.
With the Czech-Slovak trade growing slower than trade with other partners, the intra-CEEC share
has been on the decline since 1995. Furthermore, it is worth noting that non-manufactures play a
larger role in intra-CEEC trade relative to that with the EU.
Second, the EU, or rather Germany alone, has replaced the former Soviet Union as the
major trading partner for all CEEC. The share of the EU in CEEC exports rose from around one
third in 1989 to 60 percent in 1993 and has been flat thereafter. Germany's demand for CEEC
products dramatically increased in large part because of unification. The share of Germany in
CEEC exports rose from 11 percent in 1989 to 29 percent in 1993, which accounted for more than
50 percent of EU imports from the region. Aggregate CEEC exports more than doubled over
1993-99, albeit there was some variation in countries' export performance  (Table 1).
Interpretation of data on CEEC export growth needs some elaboration. Although Estonia
experienced the largest increase, the base was very low in contrast, for instance, to Hungary.19
Nonetheless, the performance of both has been superior. Romania had impressive gains over
1993-99  but these should be assessed against the contraction of almost 50 percent in the value of
their exports over 1991-93. Poland's growth was not impressive but there are two caveats-the
value of exports almost doubled during transformational recession in 1990-91 and there has been
a buoyant growth in domestic demand.
Table 1: CEECs total EU-oriented exports in 1993,  1998  and 1999  (in percent and million  of US
dollars)
1993  1998  1999  Index  (value  of  exports)
1999,1993=100
(in  million  of  US  dollars)
Bulgaria  1,189  2,529  2,315  195
Czech  Republic  6,502  16,325  17,859  275
Estonia  307  2,036  2,201  720
Hungary  5,698  16,672  18,459  324
Latvia  901  1,781  1,649  183
Lithuania  862  1,666  1,811  210
Poland  9,816  18,291  18,687  190
Romania  2,070  5,899  6,310  305
Slovak  Republic  1,643  6,092  6,091  371
Slovenia  3,671  5,822  5,831  159
TOTAL  (million  of US $)  32,656  77,113  81,212  249
Source: Derived  from UN  COMTRADE  database  as reported  by the EU and IMF  Directions  of  Trade
database  for 1999.
Trade dependence on the EU varies, however, with the Luxembourg group (i.e., first
wave entrants including Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia) trading
significantly more with the EU than the Helsinki group. In 1998 the simple average for the former
was 71 percent on the import side and 67 percent on the export side."S  Note that these averages
are higher than the share of intra-EU to external-EU trade (around 62% over 1993-98). This
indicates that these countries are more integrated into the EU in terms of trade than some EU
members. Countries, which have been later included in the Helsinki-wave of EU accession, trade
less with the EU than the Luxembourg group. They had average shares of 50 and 59 percent
respectively. This group had a much larger dispersion, mainly because of Romania's much higher
dependence both on exports (65%) and imports (62  %) from the EU than of other countries in this
group.'9 Following the 1998 Russian financial-meltdown, there are indications that the share of
the EU in trade of the Berlin group is catching up with the average for the first-wave group.
18  Own calculations  derived  from  IMF Direction  ofTrade statistics.
19 Standard deviation is 3.3 for both exports and imports for the first-wave candidates and 7.6 for both
export  and import  shares  for other  European  associates.20
2.3. Emerging  position  in regional  division  of labor: shift  towards  more advanced stages of
production
The EU has not become CEECs' major trading partner by default, that is, simply because
of the collapse of CMEA trade. Following the transformational recession during the initial stages
of transition, the aggregate value of CEEC total exports rapidly expanded almost doubling from
US $49 billion in 1993 to US $94 billion in 1998. Manufactured products were responsible for
the growth with their share in total CEEC exports increasing from 70 percent to 75 percent over
the same period.
Perhaps the most important change over 1989-99 was the transformation in CEEC
position in the international division of labor. While before the collapse of central planning
CEECs were mainly suppliers of simple raw materials to OECD economies, patterns of their
foreign trade through the 1990s point to their involvement in fmer division of labor based on
production sharing. The share of such traditional production-essentially  unprocessed-inputs  as
agricultural raw materials, ores, minerals, non-ferrous metals in total exports dramatically
declined while that of manufactured components expanded (Box 1)  20
This shift is more remarkable considering that trade with the EU rather than with less
developed countries has been its main driver. While redirection of exports from CMEA to EU
markets was initially responsible for it, industrial restructuring and improvements in corporate
governance sustained this change in highly demanding and competitive EU markets. Consider
that the share of manufactured components increased from 6 percent in 1993 to 1  1 percent in
1997 while this share in total exports rose from 6 to 9 percent (Table B1). Hence, the growth in
exports of manufactured components to the EU more than offset the apparent stagnation in
exports to other markets. In consequence, CEECs are no longer suppliers of traditional inputs to
the EU and mere recipients of products processed there as was the case under central planning.
Manufactures have been the driving force of CEEC exports to the EU. Their share in
each CEEC exports dramatically expanded in the aftermath of the collapse of the CMEA
(Kaminski 1994). In order to assess the depth of change and make some inferences about
emerging patterns of specialization, an examination of changes in the composition of trade in
terms of 'end-uses' provides a good point of departure. The use of the 'end-use'  categories of the
US Bureau of Economic Analysis allows identification of products by their use by buyers rather
than in termns  of their positions in production process (Irwin, 1996). The composition of trade in
20  One might  argue  that this growth  was simply  the result  of re-direction  of exports  from CMEA  markets  to
EU  markets.  But a simple  re-direction  occurred  earlier  in 1990-91.  The increase  in exports  over 1993-
98 was  bound  to come  from  re-tooled  capacities  and firms  with  good corporate  governance.21
Box 1: CEEC are no longer locked into traditional division  of labor
The  traditional  division  of labor  linked  least  developed  and  highly  developed  countries  in  the world
through  exchanges  of raw materials  and low  processed  goods  for processed  ones.  The  least  developed
countries  would  specialize  in exports  of production  inputs  to highly  developed  economies,  which in  tum
would  process  them  and export  some  portion  back  to  the least  developed  group.  These  inputs  include  items,
which-unlike components  and parts-have no discemible  use in their  present  form and-in  contrast  to
production  sharing-are basically  unprocessed.  Agricultural  raw materials  (SITC  2-22-27-28),  ores,  minerals
and  nonferrous  materials  (27+28+68)  may  be regarded  as  traditional  production  inputs,  i.e., not processed  in
their  present  form (Yeats  1998).  These  goods,  like manufactured  components,  are exported  (or  imported)  for
further  processing  or assembling.
An interesting  question  is  to what  extent  the position  of CEEC  in the division  of labor,  both  global
and regional,  has changed  since  the collapse  of central  planning.  Data  in Table B1  contrasting  CEEC  trade
in traditional  production  inputs  with total and  EU  trade  and  trade  in manufactured  components  (parts  as
identified  in Standard  Intemational  Trade  Classification  in Section  7)  attest  to the remarkable  shift  that  has
occurred  since  1989  in CEEC  'rules  of engagement'  in intemational  commerce.  Both  total trade  and
especially  trade  in parts  have  been  growing  much  faster  than  trade  in traditional  production  inputs.  It
recorded  the  fastest  growth  in exports  to the world  and EU  markets  as  well as in imports.
Table Bi: Traditional  versus 'non-traditional'  trade  of CEEC,  1993 and  1997
Trade  Value  in  $  Value  Index  Share  in  percent  Memo:  Trade  Balance
t  ____________________  RMillion . 11993=100  l  Ias % of  exports
|___________________  |1993  1997  1993  1997  1993  1997  1993  1997
Total  Imports  from  World
Traditional  Production  Inputs  2,281  5,085  100  223.0  4.0  4.1  50.0  30.1
Manufactured  Components  5,822 16,520  100  283.7  10.3  13.3  -108.8  -87.2
All  Goods  56,511  124,384  100  220.1  100.0 100.0  -15.1  -32.1
Total  Exports  to World
Traditional  Production  Inputs  4,564  7,273  100  159.3  9.3  7.7
Manufactured  Components  2,789  8,823  100  316.4  5.7  9.4
All  Goods  49,0881  94,180  100  191.9  100.0 100.0  ___
Total Imports from EUIS  - - -
Traditonal  Production  Inputs  1,333  2,453  100  184.0  3.3  3.1  59.7  52.7
Manufactured  Components  4,404 13,384  100  303.  9  10.8  16.7  -122.1  -103.7
AlI  Goods  40,711 80,361  100  197.4  100.0 100.0  -22.8  -33.4
Total Exports to EU15  - - - - - X  - -
Traditional  Producton  Inputs  3,307  5,182  100  156.7  10.0  8.6
Manufactured  Components  1  1,983  6,569  100  331.3  6.0  10.9
All Goods  33,149 60,247  100  181.7  100.0 100.0
Source:  Own  calculations  based  on  partners'  data  as  reported  to  UN  COMTRADE  database.
While in 1993  the  value  of exports  of traditional  production  inputs  was  almost  twice  as large  as  that of
manufactured  components,  in 1997  this  value  was 18 percent  lower.  The  share  of manufactured  parts  in
CEEC  total exports  to the world rose  from  almost  6 percent  in 1993  to above  9 percent  in 1997.  These
developments  indicate  a very  fast process  of re-integration  of CEEC  into  international  markets.  It thus
appears  that CEEC  are  no longer  locked  in a traditional  division  of labor.22
terms of 'end- use' categories provides information about the level of economic development and
a country's position in international division of labor. Respective shares of various categories in
both exports and imports indicate the extent to which domestic firms participate in more
advanced stages of production (Feenstra 1998).
Most trade occurs in the five categories as presented in Table 2. These include foods,
feeds and beverages; industrial supplies and materials; capital goods (excluding automotive
vehicles); consumer goods (except autos); and automotive vehicles and parts. The industrial
supplies and materials include mainly raw materials but also some basic manufactured goods
such as steel, newsprint, textile yarns, etc. The capital goods are used for both investment and as
intermediate products (all electrical parts and components except finished consumer goods are
regarded as capital goods). The consumer goods are finished household products.
Several studies have pointed to the shift away from agriculture and raw materials to
industrial supplies and materials in trade of highly developed countries. Feenstra (1998) notes that
while the share of food and beverages and industrial raw materials accounted in 1925 for almost
82 percent of U.S. imports, it fell to only 23 percent in 1995. Quite a dramatic change that had
been brought about mainly by imports of capital goods, whose share grew from 0.4 percent in
1925 to 7 percent in 1965 and 34 percent in 1995. Is similar change underway in trade of CEEC
with the EU absorbing almost two-thirds of its exports?
Several observations can be drawn from data tabulated in Table 2. The most general one
is that CEEC exports and imports increased much more than those of the European Union. In
consequence, CEEC as a region has become the second largest-after  the U.S.-importer  of EU
products. With the value of imports of almost US$100 billion in 1998, its share in EU-external
exports increased from 5 percent in 1993 to 8 percent in 1998. The share in EU external imports
also increased rather considerably from 4 to 6 percent over the same period.
Second, the composition of CEEC trade in terms of end-use categories with the EU has
been converging towards that of the EU. This process has two aspects. It involves the growing
similarity between composition of exports and imports of CEECs and the similarity between
respective compositions of EU trade and CEEC trade with the EU. While both suggest the
process of catching up, the first is the product of a two-way intra-industry trade-because  of more
diversified consumer taste and production needs, exports and imports of products from the same
group grow. The process of catching up with the EU seems to explain the growing similarity
between the EU and CEEC compositions of trade, while the closing of gaps between CEEC
export and import composition points to industrial restructuring. By these two measures, CEECs23
scored much higher than Turkey, whose export composition in 1989 did not deviate much from
that of aggregate CEEC exports in the same year.
The most rapid closure of differences in respective export and import shares occurred in
two product categories-capital  goods and automotive products. Note that the closure did not
involve a relative decline of CEEC imports from the EU. It occurred thanks to rapidly expanding
exports-the  value of exports of automotive sector increased more than five-fold and exports of
capital goods rose more four-fold.
Table 2: Change in the composition of CEEC and Turkey's trade with the EU in terms of end-use
and the EU's trade with the world, 1989,  1993,  1997  and 1998
CEECs  Turkey  European  Union  Share  of CEEC
. ._____  . in EU
Exports  I  Im  Exports  Imports  Exports  Imports  Exports Imports
All Goods  1989 12,449 11,755  6,581  6,464  800,241  804,650  1.47  1.55
(in million  of US  dollars)  1993 33,149 40,711  8,242  14,306  850,575  893,121  4.79  3.71
1997 60,248 80,364 13,077 24,112 1,136,715 1,239,006  7.07  4.86
1998 77,113 99,157 15,121 23,424 1,235,692 1,315,128  8.02  5.86
Index  1998,1993=100  233  244  183  164  145  147  168  158
Food,  Feeds  and Beverages  1989  18.6  10.5  14.7  5.3  10.9  11  1.42  2.62
(in percent)  1993  8.5  9.4  16.9  2.7  12.4  12.3  3.63  2.56
1997  5.2  5.9  15.8  3.0  11.1  10.7  3.76  2.36
1998  4.4  5.4  13.6  2.9  10.7  10.41  4.05  2.48
Index  1998(value  of exports),  1993=100  120  140  148  176  125  125  112  97
Industrial  Supplies  and  Materials  1989  28.3  6.1  18.8  9  10.2  9.8  0.88  4.47
(in  percent)  1993  18.3  6.1  7.3  8.4  8.9  8.4  3.28  8.09
1997  13  5.3  5.7  7.3  8.3  7.7  4.51  8.21
1998  11.2  4.6  5.2  5.8  7.0  6.6  5.27  9.95
Index  1998(value  of exports),  1993=100  142  184  131  113  114  116  161  123
Capital  Goods  (excluding  1989  8.3  29.5  3.8  35.9  22.8  23.9  1.90  0.54
Motor  vehicles)  1993  13.5  28.3  7.3  36.3  21.8  23.3  6.21  2.15
(in percent)  1997  22.3  31.1  10.7  35.9  23.6  25.9  9.32  4.19
I  1998  25.7  32.2  12.7  37.9  24.9  26.5  10.38  5.69
Index  1998(value  of exports),  1993=100  4431  277  319,  171  166  167  167  264
Consumer  Goods  (excluding  1989  42.6  48.21  61.5  43  44.4  43  1.59  1.53
Automobiles)  1993  54.6  46  67.1  40.3  44.5  44.1  4.95  4.60
(in  percent)  11997  50.8  45.81  65.3  39.6  43.1  42.8  7.51  5.77
1998  47.4  47.61  65.3  40.7  42.8  42.5  8.921  6.54
Index  1998(value  of exports),  1993=100  202i  252t  1791  165  140  142  1801  142
Automotive:  vehicles  and  parts  1989  1.8  5.8  1.2  6.8  11.7  12.2  0.73  0.23
(in percent)  1993  5.1  10.2  1.3  12.4  12.4  11.8  3.94  1.60
1997  8.7  11.9  2.5  14.2  13.9  12.9  6.05  3.28
|  |11998  11.2  10.1  2.9  12.0  14.3  13.8  5.67  4.76
index1998(valueof  exports),  1993=100  l  5111  241  4091  158|  168  172  144  297
Source: Own calculations based on data reported by the EU to UN COMTRADE database.24
The still existing disparities between EU and CEEC baskets in terms of end-use
categories are most visible in foods, feeds and beverages and industrial supplies and materials.
The share of foods, feeds and beverages in CEEC exports to the EU has been falling. So has their
share in EU-extemal imports, albeit at a slower pace (Table 2). The CEECs continue exporting
relatively more of industrial supplies and materials than the EU does, but the difference has been
on the decline. It fell from 11 percentage points in 1989 to 8 in 1993 and 4 in 1998. Although the
share of industrial supplies and materials declined over 1989-98, their share in EU external
imports increased from 5 percent to 10 percent over this period. Nonetheless, the combined share
of food, feeds, beverages and industrial supplies in CEEC imports has moved very close to that of
the EU.
Third, data in Table 2 point to a definite shift in CEEC EU-oriented exports from
agriculture-based products and industrial raw materials towards manufactured goods. The shares
of the latter significantly increased, whereas these of the former declined. The combined share of
foods, feeds, beverages and industrial supplies fell from 47 percent in 1989 to 27 percent in 1993,
21 percent in 1997 and 16 percent in 1998.21  On the import side, the aggregate share of
agricultural products and industrial supplies declined between 1989 and 1993 from 17 to 16
percent and to 10 percent in 1998.
In all, the major conclusion that can be drawn from data presented in Table 2 is that
products traded by CEECs are at increasingly advanced stages of production on both export and
import side. Under central planning CEEC's non-CMEA links followed the pattern of a
traditional division of labor-they  essentially exchanged with highly developed countries raw
materials and low processed inputs for processed manufactures. This situation seems to have
changed rather dramatically in the 1990s. Their trade suggests the increase in importance of
processed manufactures at the expense of raw materials and agricultural products. These
developments indicate a very fast process of re-integration of CEEC into international markets
following the demise of central planning with sizable benefits to CEEC and EU firms alike.
2.4. Factor content of EU-oriented exports
According to Heckscher-Ohlin Theorem, commodity trade patterns reflect differences in
comparative advantage as determined by different factor endowments among countries. A
country tends to export those goods that use factors in relative abundance-an  outcome of a
21 The comparison  of CEEC  shares  between  1989  and 1993  has to account  for  the emergence  of four  new
states  by 1993.  The data also  does  not include  trade with  partners  who  did not report  to the UN
COMTRADE  database.  Among  these  the most important  is the absence  of data on trade  with what
was  the Soviet  Union.25
competitive market mechanism efficiently allocating resources. Exploring a full causal chain
linking factor endowments with comparative advantage  and trade pattern is not relevant for this
discussion.  The question germane here concerns broad changes in relative factor intensities as
revealed in exports to the EU.
We break commodity groups as classified in the SITC (Rev. 1) into four groups reflecting
their distinct relative factor intensities (Krause 1986). These groups are natural resource based,
unskilled labor intensive, technology intensive and skilled labor intensive products. The goodness
of results obtained hinges critically on the quality of a classification used to examnine  export
baskets over time by factor mix. The advantage of the classification used here is that all industries
are taken into account and a four-digit industry appears only in one classification. Its weakness is
that some industries may be intensive in terms of more than one factor. Although this may clearly
distort the results, one may identify on this basis broad lines of change occurring in export offer
over time.
The two groups-natural  resource based and unskilled labor intensive products-tend  to
represent lines of production characterized by low value added, high natural resource content and
simple technologies. They usually account for a dominant share of exports in countries that are at
the lower level of economic development. While the line dividing the capital intensive and skilled
labor intensive groups is fuzzy, they both contain products requiring more sophisticated inputs
than those found in the first two groups. Capital based sectors are, however, characterized by
larger R&D spending than skilled labor intensive industries.
Considering CEECs' large pool of relatively low-cost labor and its moderate climate
conditions favoring agriculture, one would expect that labor-intensive products together with
natural resource intensive products would dominate its export basket. Adding to that the
abundance of highly skilled labor relative to their GDP per capita, skilled labor-intensive products
within labor intensive products should account for a sizable  allotment.
The change in the composition of CEEC's EU-oriented exports in terms of factor intensities
corroborates these expectations, albeit with a delay. Over 1989-93  unskilled labor intensive
industrial goods drove CEEC reorientation of trade towards the EU (Table 3). This share doubled in
Bulgaria's exports (from 16% to 31  %)  and significantly  increased in exports from Hungary  (from
19% to 27%), from Poland (from 17% to 30%) and from Romania (from 36% to 62%).
Although unskilled labor intensive  products still account for a dominant portion of CEEC
exports to the EU, their  share was on the decline over 1993-97.22 So was the  share of natural
22  The exception  is Bulgaria.  Its export  behavior  in terms of factor intensities resembled that of other fast-
reforming  CEECs  until 1996,  albeit  for a wrong  reason,  i.e., subsidies.  With  the cut of export26
resource intensive products that were of major importance under central planning in the 1980s.  The
share of skilled labor intensive products in total EU-oriented exports from CEEC rose from 26
percent to 29 percent (Table 3).
Table 3: Factor  intensities of CEECs'  exports  and imports  from the EU, 1989, 1993 and 1997
Product  categories  Exports  to the EU  [  Imports  from  the EU
1989  1993  1997  Index  1997 1989  1993  1997  Index 1997
1993=100  1993=100
Natural  Resource  50.6  33.6  23.8  130  20.4  18.9  15.0  156
Unskilled  Labor  21.6  29.5  25.8  160  12.3  17.2  16.2  186
Capital  Intensive  14.5  17.3  25.7  271  45.5  37.9  40.2  210
Skilled  Labor  13.2  19.6  24.6  230  21.8  26.0  28.7  218
All Goods  (in US$  million)*  12,294 32,655 59,661  183  11,522 39,997 79,135  198
A  For 1989,  data  available  only  for Bulgaria,  former  Czechoslovakia,  Hungary,  Poland  and  Romania.
Source:  Own  calculations  based  on data  reported  by  the EU  to UN COMTRADE  database.
The gap between CEEC endowment in highly skilled labor and factor content of their
exports has been closing. The value of these exports in 1997 was 130  percent over its 1993 value
and the value of technology based exports was 171  percent over its level in 1993.  Note also that the
growth of technology and skilled labor intensive  products was much faster than that of natural
resource and unskilled labor intensive products. In consequence, the aggregate share of skilled labor
intensive products and technology intensive  products in EU-oriented exports increased from 37
percent in 1993 to 50 percent in 1997.
Similar trends in CEEC imports from the EU provide strong argument about significant
returns stemming from mtegration into EU markets. The most dynamic component of their imports
are products with high content of technology  and human capital. These products embody
knowledge and have similar effect as technology  transfers. Their imports increased considerably
more than resource- and unskilled labor-intensive  products over 1993-97. Juxtaposing  this with our
earlier finding that imports of capital equipment recorded the largest increase among end-use
product categories suggests a very significant progress in integration into EU markets at
increasingly  more sophisticated levels.
But the progress has been uneven among CEECs, although their trade with the EU shares
the same dynamic characteristics.  First, the shift in composition of their trade indicates growing
participation in more sophisticated and higher value-added production activity.
Second, this participation  has been generating demand in EU markets for skilled labor
intensive and technology  based products. In fact, these two categories of products have shaped  the
subsidies  following  the implementation  of a radical  stabilization-cum-transformation  program  in
1997,  exports  of unskilled  labor  intensive  products  became  the driving  force  of Bulgarian  EU-oriented
exports.27
dynamics  of CEEC  exports  to EU markets.  The share  of high skilled  labor  intensive  and
technology-based  products  exceeded  50  percent  in exports  of the Czech  Republic  (62%),  Hungary
(67%),  Slovakia  (62%)  and Slovenia  (57%).  The scope  of change  is best illustrated  by the fact  that
except  for Slovenia  there  was  no other  CEEC  in 1993  with  the aggregate  share of these  exports
exceeding  50 percent!
The  developments  in foreign  trade of CEEC  indicate  a dramatic  change  in their position
in intemational  division  of labor,  which  has become  organized  largely  around  their most
important  trading  partner-the  EU. While  initially,  i.e., over 1989-93,  EU turned  out to be a very
absorptive  market  for unskilled  labor  intensive  manufactured  goods,  skilled  labor and technology-
based, capital  intensive  products  have  driven  subsequently  export  expansion  of most CEECs.
The reorientation  of geographical  patterns  of trade  from the former  CMEA  and Soviet
Union (former  Yugoslavia  for Slovenia)  accompanied  by a large  increase  in both exports  and
imports  of manufactured  goods  has produced  a high degree  of mutual  interdependence  in EU-
CEEC  trade.  This shift towards  trade  involving  more advanced  stages  of production  has an
important  political  economy  implication.  Mutual  interdependence  tends to weaken  protectionist
interests  as both exporters  and importers  increasingly  share  in gains.  Increases  in intra-industry
trade and intra-product  trade based on production  fragmentation  have similar  impact.  Exporters
and importers  tend  to operate  in the same  industries  as firms operating  in global  cycles  of
production  of MNCs  and any disruption  in this trade would  produce  losses  with no respect  for
national  borders.  Therefore,  they  constitute  potentially  a strong  anti-protectionist  lobby in both
EU countries  and CEECs.
Moreover,  further  growth  in trade will  produce  smaller  dislocation  of resources
considering  that already  a large portion  of their  trade is of intra-industry  type or more specifically
involves  intra-product  trade generated  by fragmentation  of production.
3. FDI and integration into the EU
Integrationist  accords,  even  those limited  to trade, enhance  credibility  of the government
in a transition  economy  in terms  of commitment  to economy-opening  reforms.  The accords  do
not have to have  special  clauses  on treatment  of foreign  investment  to serve  as credibility-
enhancing  mechanism:  a domestic  liberal  regime  obtains  an extra  credibility  when a country
becomes  party of the agreement  with a highly  developed  partner.  The impact  of the policy-
induced  integration  process  on foreign  capital  inflows  is twofold.  First,  by reducing  the risk  that
foreign  investor  face and improving  a country's  business  climate,  they  increase  the flow  of direct28
and portfolio investment often diverting them from other regions. 23 Combined with additional
incentives associated with the improved access to markets of developed countries, the increased
inflows may be quite considerable. These can be driven by the desire of firms to overcome trade
barriers and take advantage of emerging economies of scale.
Second, the increased foreign participation in investment outlays contributes to a faster
industrial restructuring based on better technologies and know how as well as improvement in
corporate governance. An important aspect of foreign investment, often neglected in dominant
economic commentary, is the fact that FDI allow for easier access to international markets
through distribution channels of a parent company. Available evidence suggests that establishing
presence in international markets often requires expending significant resources (Roberts and
Tybout 1997). Access to foreign markets is thus an important asset of foreign owned firms.
The transition from central planning to a market economy opened previously closed
markets to penetration by foreign investors. Former communist countries had lots to offer: All of
them had a large pool of cheap labor-both  skilled and unskilled. Some (mainly countries of
Commonwealth of Independent States-a  loose organization encompassing 12 forrner Soviet
Republics excluding the Baltic states) had large deposits of non-renewable natural resources and
others were conveniently located close to EU. Countries that had been included in the EU
integrationist project also offered preferential access to EU markets. How have these factors
shaped FDI inflows?
3.1. Impact  of the integration  framework  on attractiveness  of CEECs  to foreign  investors
The EA-triggered integration process has offered a number of advantages with the
potential for attracting foreign investors. Consider first economies of scale associated with
preferential access to EU markets. The EU shortened transition periods by eliminating tariffs and
quotas on industrial imports from CEECs-by  1997 CEEC exporters of manufactures had duty-
free market access. Thus, investors seeking unfettered access to EU markets would also consider
locating production facilities in CEECs.
Second, the EA guaranteed the right of establishment to EU firms guaranteed by the EA
as well as commnitments  to liberalize access to services together with other provisions envisaging
an orderly process of interaction between the EU and its associate members have served as a
credibility-enhancing mechanism.
23  For instance,  once  the process  of their accession  to the EU  began Spain  and  Portugal  experienced  large
inflows  of foreign  direct  investment.  The respective  shares  FDI  in GDP  rose from 1.1  percent and  0.8
percent  in 1981-85  to 2.1  and 2.9 percent  over  1988-92.29
Third, provisions aligning economic regimes with those in the EU were particularly
significant because their implementation amounted to the promise of an orderly transition to an
economy based on competitive markets.
In addition,  the EA contained a special  provision allowing CEECs to use a duty drawback,
that is, refunding exporters to the EU for duties paid on imported inputs. This was quite an unusual
arrangement  since FTAs as a rule prohibit their signatories  the use of drawback in their mutual
exports. With a drawback scheme in place, a domestic firm (in this case the EU one) would have to
compete with a firm from the FTA partner (CEEC) on unequal footing. For instance, if two firms,
one from the EU and another from CEEC, producing the same final product import intermediate
inputs from a third country, then a CEEC firm under a duty drawback regime would have an edge
over the EU supplier in EU markets. With some modifications, this provision was in place until the
Pan-European Cumulation Agreement, which is based on the principle of non-drawback,  went into
effect in 1997-98.
While the rationale for this exemption was to strengthen CEEC competitiveness in EU
markets,  the provision had provided CEECs with an extra tool to attract foreign investors. It offered
investors from third countries targeting EU markets saving on import duties that would have to be
paid had the investment been in the EU. Since during the initial stages of a project imports  often
tend to be quite significant as many intermediate  products are brought from a home country, this
was an extra incentive for third country investors seeking to jump tariff barriers in the EU. But this
arrangement  has probably also triggered interest among EU producers, especially those heavily
relying on imports from third countries in their production for EU markets. It has provided them
with an extra incentive to move production  to a CEEC.
On the other hand, the framework had two potential shortcomings, which-it  seems with
the benefit of hindsight-did  not unfold. First, some analysts feared that the framework would
offer a back-door entry for vested interests pressing for higher levels of government intervention
in the economy and thus encourage the shift to managed trade. 24
Second, the integration framework has not closed the option to the EU of resorting to
protectionist measures. Indeed, there were a number of easy exits increasing the scope of
contingent protectionism, which usually deters investment (Rollo and Smith, 1993). Actual
developments, however, did not confirm these fears as there is little, if any empirical evidence
that the above shortcomings negatively affected FDI inflows either because of contingent
protectionism or distortions generated by managed trade.
24  For the latter  point,  see Messerlin  (1992).30
The framework had, however, two more serious weaknesses-both  of them related to the
rules of origin used to determine goods and services entitled to preferential treatment. While no
counterfactual evidence is available, it is quite likely that they deterred many investors. First, the
rules of origin were rather restrictive for non-EU investors. Note that during the initial stages,
production often requires massive use of imported intermediate products and components. As a
result, many potential investment opportunities might have been lost-a  point of considerable
consequence given the relatively large involvement of non-EU firms in investment in CEEC.
Winters (1993:13) argued that restrictive rules of origin "...  effectively preclude many non-EU
firms from establishing viable plants in the Central and Eastern European countries." It seems
that simplifying and decreasing "local content" requirement would have had a positive impact on
industrial restructuring in CEECs.
Second, bilateral (subsequently diagonal for CEFTA founders) rules of origin
exacerbated negative impact of the hub-and-spoke pattern on CEECs. Until 1997-98 when a new
system of rules of origin under the Pan-European Cumulation Agreement went into effect, EU
firms had little incentive to locate production units of the same supply chain in different CEECs
or to outsource to firms in other CEECs.
The advantages of the policy-induced integration into the EU in terms of attracting FDI
clearly outweigh the above-discussed shortcomings. Duty-free access to EU markets and
transformation of economic regimes towards meeting the requirements of the acquis have clearly
increased the attractiveness of CEECs to foreign investors. The advantage to a recipient country
is that FDI usually contribute to the development of a two-way inter-industry trade and often
integrate established production facilities into global networks of production and marketing,
which in tum gives rise to intra-product trade (Kaminski and Ng, 2000).
This type of trade derived from production fragmentation, mainly carried out by MNCs
(multinational corporations), offers several benefits: It gives direct access to larger markets
allowing exploitation of economies of scale. It boosts exports without firms incurring investment
in establishing market presence. Last but not least, it offers greater stability in earnings thanks to
a global reach of a "parent" company.
3.2. FDI flows  to CEECs:  sources  of variation
Indeed, notwithstanding these imperfections, transition economies received on average
more capital inflows in terms of per capita than most developing countries (Garibaldi et al. 1999).
But within transition economies there was a significant difference between CEECs and former
Soviet republics (excluding the Baltic States) economies. While over 1990-97 all transition31
economies received around US$ 64 billion in FDI, US$ 49 billion (or 77%) went to CEECs. As
Havrylyshyn  and Wolfe  note,  ".. . even those  CIS countries  that have enjoyed  consistent  growth
have not attracted anything like the same amounts of foreign direct investment." (1999:14).
Considering that Russia alone is larger in terms of GDP and population than CEECs combined,
the difference is startling. Claessens, Oks and Palastri (1998) attribute this difference to what they
call the "EU-factor."
Table 4: FDI flows to CEEC over 1990-99 (in million of US dollars) and FDI per capita (in US
dollars)
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  TOTAL  GDP  per
1990-99  capita  1998
(in US
dollars)
Bulgaria  4  56  41  40  105  90  109  505  537  734  2,221  1,140
Czech  R.  207  400  600  654  878  2,568 1,435  1,275  1,567  1,768  11,352  5,200
Estonia  0  0  82  162  214  202  150  130  489  566  1,995  3,330
Hungary  311  1,462 1,479  2,350  1,144  4,519  1,982  1,785  1,454  1,027  17,513  4,430
Latvia  0  0  29  45  214  180  328  515  220  208  1,739  2,430
Lithuania  0  0  10  12  31  73  152  328  1,075  1,041  2,722  2,230
Poland  89  291  678  1,715 1,875  3,659 4,498  3,041  6,164  6,180  28,190  3,590
Romania  0  40  77  94  341  419  263  1,224  1,598  1,716  5,772  1,420
Slovenia  0  0  111  113  84  170  186  321  165  255  1,405  9,680
Slovakia  18  82  100  199  203  183  330  161  508  275  2,059  3,700
TOTAL  625  2,275 3,166  5,344  4,984  11,973 9,324 8,780  13,240 13,036  72,747
per  capita  (in US  dollars)  TOTAL  Share  of the
1990-99  tOtal  in 1998
capitaI GDP  (in %)
Bulgaria  0  7  5  5  13  11  13  60  64  87  265  15.5
Czech  R.  20  39  58  63  85  249  139  124  152  172  1,102  17.9
Estonia  0  0  55  108  143  135  100  87  326  378  1,330  28.6
Hungary  30  143  145  230  112  443  194  175  143  101  1,717  36.5
Latvia  0  0  12  18  86  72  131  206  88  83  696  25.2
Lithuania  0  0  3  3  8  20  41  89  291  281  736  20.4
Poland  2  8  18  44  49  95  117  79  160  160  730  15.9
Romania  0  2  3  4  15  18  12  54  70  76  254  12.6
Slovenia  0  0  56  57  42  85  93  161  83  128  703  5.9
Slovakia  3  15  19  37  38  34  61  30  94  51  381  8.9
TOTAL  6  22  30  51  47  114  89  83  126  124  691
Coefficient 1.91  2.07  1.20  1.23  0.79  1.17  0.65  0.55  0.63  0U69  0.6[  -0.49
lof  Il  ll  l  l  l  llI
|variation"  ll  ll  l  l  l  l  ll
Note: 'Icoefficient  of variation is the ratio of standard deviation to the average.
Source: Economic  Survey of Europe  2000  No. 3, Economic Commission for Europe, United Nations, New
York and Geneva 1999; and Global  Development  Finance 1997, The World Bank, Washington DC 1998.
While the "EU-factor" is a good candidate to explain the startling difference between
CEECs and former Soviet republic, it would fail to explain the variation in FDI inflows to CEECs
over 1990-99 (Table 4). Geography, for starters, has clearly mattered. With the unification of32
Germany in 1991  and EFTAN enlargement of the EU in 1995,  the number of CEECs directly
bordering with the EU has significantly increased. With the exception of Bulgaria and to some
extent Romania, geography works strongly in favor of other CEECs. Only Romania and Baltic
states (though they have easy access to convenient sea links) do not border the EU. 25
Other CEECs have superb geographical location. A 60 mile line from the border of the EU
captures  almost the whole territory of Slovenia, around 50 percent of the territory of the Czech
Republic, one-fourth of the territory of Slovakia  and an area almost reaching Budapest-the  capital
and industrial center of Hungary (Kierzkowski  2000). Geography suggests that these countries
along with Poland's western region are potentially the location for the maquiladoras of the EU in
the same way as Mexican areas bordering the U.S. are for US MNCs.
Data tabulated in Table 4 indeed suggest that countries well within the reach of a 60-mile
boundary obtained the bulk of FDI inflows, albeit with a caveat. By this criterion alone, the Czech
Republic and Slovenia should have been the major recipients.  But this was not the case in the
1  990s, as Hungary and Estonia received significantly  larger FDI flows on a per capita basis. The
Czech Republic ranks third and Slovenia  ranks sixth among 1  O-CEECs.  Bulgaria and Romania,
who ranked 9h and 1  0O  respectively, obtained significantly lower per capita FDI inflows than
Latvia and Lithuania.
Yet, the variation in FDI flows to CEECs fell over 1996-99, as the values of the
coefficient of variation (ratio of standard deviation to weighted average) for FDI inflows (last row
in Table 4) standardized by the coefficient of variation of GDP per capita in 1997 indicate.
Hungary attracted the largest inflows per capita among CEECs over 1990-96 except in 1994
(Estonia). But subsequently the annual inflows of FDI to Hungary were falling, whereas other
countries-Baltic  states, Poland, Bulgaria and Romania-began  attracting FDI in 1996-99.
Hence, CEECs neglected during initial stages of transition have become significant recipients of
foreign investment.
Institutional environment, the mode of privatization, and the record of servicing
sovereign debt seem to be among most important factors explaining the variation in FDI inflows.
Institutional environment appears to stand out. Using a rigorous econometric analysis Garibaldi et
al. (1999) show that legal and political climate rather than macroeconomic fundamentals have
shaped FDI flows to transition economies. It appears that macroeconomic stability without
business friendly environment was not enough to attract foreign investment. Claessens, Oks and
25  Although  Bulgaria  has a conmmon  border  with  the EU, economic  benefits  are rather  negligibly  as Greece
is the poorest  member  of the EU.33
Palastri  (1998) arrive at a similar conclusion linking progress in economic reforms with FDI.
Kaminski (2000) corroborates this result. 26
The choice of the mode and scope of privatization as well as debt-servicing record
favored Hungary during the initial stages of transition (Kaminski and Riboud 2000). The decision
not to default on its foreign debt put to rest the debate about 'dangers' of foreign capital in
Hungary. Hungary opted for privatization to an outside investor, and opened the so-called
strategic sectors (telecommunications, utilities, and financial services) to foreign investors around
4-5 years before any other CEEC was ready for this move. Privatization-related FDI flows to
Hungary accounted for around 40 percent of total inflows. The Czech mass voucher privatization
program erected barrier to FDI, while the Slovenian legal framework-rooted  in Yugoslav
worker's self-management-turned  out to keep foreign investors at bay. Despite the selection of a
similar mode of privatization as Hungary-albeit  initially much less radical and extensive in
scope-protracted  negotiations on Poland's private debt under the aegis of the London Club kept
investors away until around 1993-94.
Other considerations seem to account for Bulgaria and Romania's poor performance in
terms of attracting FDI. Proximity to war-prone former Yugoslavia did not make them an
attractive location in the 1990s. But it seems that stalled reforms were the major reason. Consider
that 80 percent of total inflows came to Bulgaria over 1997-99. This coincided with the war in
neighboring Kosovo in 1999, but above all with the first serious effort to establish
macroeconomic stability and liberalize the economy following the 1996 financial crisis and
change in government.
3.3. FDI and trade with the EU
FDI are a powerful vehicle for transfer of technology and best practices in management.
They also contribute to integration of domestic production capacities into global markets. The
evidence from several CEECs strongly suggests that foreign firms are more foreign trade-oriented
than domestic firms, thus making a relatively larger contribution to reintegration of CEECs into
the world economy and especially into the EU. Foreign firms have already emerged as the largest
exporters in such countries as the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary and Poland. In 1998 they
accounted for around 80 percent of Hungarian EU-oriented exports of manufactures and 40
percent of Polish exports (Kaminski and Riboud 2000, Kaminski and Smarzynska 2000). Indirect
26 He examined  correlation  coefficients  between  total  FDI  per capita over  1990-97,  the rule of law,
attractiveness  to business,  and inflation  in 1997.  There  appears  to  be a strong  positive  correlation
between  FDI and institutional  parameters,  i.e., the rule of law and  attractiveness  to business (0.67  and
0.68),  and a very  weak negative  correlation  (-0.27)  with  the rate of inflation  in 1997.34
effects  that relate  to restructuring,  productivity  spillovers  and foreign  finrns'  contribution  to the
development  of the export  infrastructure  and services  are  more  difficult  to capture.  However,
their impact  works  through  lowering  transaction  costs and attracting  other foreign  firms-often
customers  of banks, insurance  agents,  etc.
MNCs  are also instrumental  in setting  up supply  chains  cutting across  many  national
borders.  Trade within  global  production  and marketing  networks  organized  around  MNCs  has
been the most rapidly  growing  component  of world  trade for the last two decades.  As a result,
inter-industry  division  of labor  has become  increasingly  marginalized  by a more  complex
specialization  implicit  in intra-industry  trade  presently  enriched  by intra-product  specialization
that extends  the division  of labor  to parts and components  of products  within  larger  tansborder
supply  chains  (Kierzkowski  2000).
How have  FDI affected  CEEC  trade  with the EU? It seems  that FDI have  been  mainly
responsible  for the shift from  unskilled  labor  intensive  and natural  resource  intensive  products  to
skilled  labor  intensive  and technology  based products.  While  without  access  to data at the level of
firmns  it would  be impossible  to give a precise  assessment,  available  empirical  evidence  for
Hungary  and Poland  suggests  that FDI tend  to target skilled  labor and technology  intensive  lines
of production  in the CEECs  (Kaminski  and Riboud  2000,  Kamninski  and Smarzynska  2000).
Data  compiled  in Table 5 provide  empirical  support  to the following  general
observations.  First,  the share  of skilled  labor  and capital  intensive  products  increased  for all
CEECs  (column  "c"). Estonia  and Lithuania  recorded  particularly  large increases,  but from  very
low levels  in 1993.  The spectacular  increase  in the share  of skilled  labor  intensive  and technology
from  40 percent  in 1993  to 68 percent  (or from US$ 2.3 billion  to US$ 10  billion) of total EU-
destined  exports  can be fully  attributed  to FDI.  Note that by 1997  Hungary  obtained  already  54
percent  of total FDI flows  over 1990-99  (column  "d" in Table 5) and their cumulative  value
accounted  by 1997  to 31 percent  (column  "e") of the 1998  GDP.  On similar grounds,  one may
also conclude  that very significant  increases  in the share of these  products  in Czech,  Polish  and
Slovak  exports  were due to FDI activity.  On the other  hand, Slovenia,  which received  the smallest
amount  of FDI among  CEECs  in terms  of its GDP (column  "e"), registered  a relatively  modest  in
crease  in these exports:  their value  increased  from  US$ 2 billion  to US$ 3 billion and accounted
for 58 percent  of Slovenia's  EU-destined  exports  in 1998.35
Second, the share of intra-industry trade, i.e., two-way trade in similar products in trade
with the EU, as measured by the G-L (Grubbel-Lloyd) index, 27 increased between 1993 and 1998
for all CEECs except Bulgaria (stagnant), Lithuania (stagnant) and Latvia (contraction) (see
column "b" in Table 5). The largest increase in the value of G-L index registered Estonia
Table 5: FDI and trade, 1993  and 1998  (in  US dollars  and  percent)
Share  in  exports  of  networks Grubbel-  Share  of  skilled  Percent  of  Ratio  of
and  other  parts  and  Lloyd  Index labor  and  capital  cumulative  FDI  in  cumulative
components  in EU-oriented  intensive  products  earlier  year  in  FDI  to  GDP
exports  of  manufactures  in EU-oriented  total  FDI  over  (in  %)
excluding  chemicals  (in %)  exports  (in %)  1990-99  (in %)
X  "  .a.  Sbf  c.  "d-  Ile.
Bulgaria  1993  5.7  39  32  4.5  1.5
= 1998  4.1  39  35  36.4  6.7
Czech  Rep.  1993  16.0  57  48  10.6  6.7
1  19981  27.5  68  62  34.8  12.6
Estonia  1993  12.5  30  16  4.1  5.3
1998  34.2  39  25  54.2  13.5
Hungary  1993  15.2  53  40  18.6  16.4
1998  42.0  55  67  53.8  31.3
Latvia  1993  11.2  33  6  1.7  1.5
1998  8.9  25  j  71.1  19.0
Lithuania  1993  8.6  23  13  0.4  0.5
1998  9.6  23  25  21.5  4.5
Poland  11993  21.2  40  31  3.8  3.2
1998  30.0  43  45  46.4  8.9
Romania 11993  18.1  28  20  |  2.0  |  0.8
1 1998  9.4  |  32  j  26  |  38.6  5.4
Slovakia  11993  10.2  42  44  9.7  3.8
11998  41.8  51  j  63  42.6  5.5
Slovenia  i931  20.1  54  51  7.9  1.7
191 T  32.5  |  59  58  54.2  4.1
Source:  World  Development  Report,  The  World  Bank  and Oxford  University  Press,  1995  and 1999/2000,
FDI as  in Table  4, Kaminski  and Ng (2000)  and  own  calculations  from data  in the UN  COMTRADE  database
as reported  by the EU.
followed by Slovakia, Czech Republic, Romania and Poland. FDI measured in terms of the
increase in their share in GDP over 1993-98  significantly increased for all of them. On the other
hand, CEECs (except Latvia), which received relatively small amounts of FDI over 1990-97
(columns "d" and "e"), did not experience expansion in intra-industry trade. Evidence from other
countries (Markusen 1998) as well as from transition economies in their trade with the EU
27 The Grubbel-Lloyd  index is the difference  between  unity  and the quotient  of the absolute  difference
between  exports  and imports  of a given sector  and  the total  of irnports  and exports  for this sector.
Calculations  here are based  on 4-digit SITC  data.36
(Hoekman 1996) suggest that increased penetration of CEECs' industrial sectors have contributed
to the growth of this trade.
Changes in exports falling within global networks of production and marketing capture
more adequately the role of FDI in trade than intra-industry trade as measured by the G-L index.
While the G-L encapsulates a two-way trade in the same categories of products, it does not fully
take into account the most dynamic ingredient of world trade occurring in international
production networks organized around MNCs (Kaminski and Ng 2000). New technologies
facilitate the fragmentation of production process, that is, dividing the industry's value chain into
smaller functions that can be contracted out to suppliers located in different countries (Zysman
and Schwartz 1998). MNCs are instrumental in setting up supply chains cutting across many
national borders. Complex specialization implicit in intra-industry trade extends the division of
labor to parts and components of products within larger transborder supply chains. This type of
trade is often referred to as intra-product trade (Kierzkowski 2000).
The expansion in network-driven trade contributes to boosting productivity and integrates
the national economy into global markets. Signs abound that CEEC producers are becoming part
of this rapidly emerging global division of labor based on production fragmentation. Like highly
developed countries, CEECs have also experienced a faster growth of trade in parts and
components than in trade of manufactures. For instance, between 1993 and 1998 the total value of
exports of parts and components from CEECs to the EU grew almost fivefold (4.8 times) while
that of manufactures almost threefold (2.8 times). Imports of parts and components grew four
times, while those of manufactures excluding chemicals increased less than three times (2.8) over
the same period.
In order to capture fully this trade, we identify parts, components and final products in
three networks usually organized around MNCs-automotive  network, telecommunication
equipment jointly analyzed with office equipment and automatic data processing machines
(hereafter 'information revolution' network) and furniture network. 28 These networks have played
a growing role in CEECs' trade with the EU. The share of these networks together with other
parts and components in CEECs' exports of manufactures to the EU rose from 21 percent (17%
coming from final products, components and parts from networks and the balance from trade in
parts in other areas) in 1993 to 37 percent (31% from networks) in 1998. On the import side, the
corresponding figures were 29 percent (22% in networks) in 1993 and 35 percent (26% in
28  For a detailed  analysis  of product  categories  falling  into each  network  and the method  to estimate  parts
and  components  involved  in production  fragmentation,  see Kaminski  and Ng (2000).37
networks) in 1998. Thus, more than one third of CEECs trade with the EU appears to relate to
intra-product trade generated by fragmentation of the global production process.
But the involvement of CEECs in intra-product exchanges varies considerably across the
region (see column "a" in Table 5) suggesting significant dependence on earlier FIX inflows and
geographical location. The share of networks together with other parts and components in EU-
oriented exports of manufactures (excluding chemical) increased for all countries of the
Luxembourg group and Slovakia from the Helsinki group. While the expansion was spectacular
for Slovakia (from 10% to 42%), Hungary (from 15% to 42%) and Estonia (13% to 34%), this
trade drove exports of other Luxembourg countries as well. With the exception of Slovakia, the
link to the size of FDI inflows and GDP per capita seems to be strong across the board. 29
It thus seems that foreign owned firms have  already made significant contributions to
integrate CEECs producers into their supply chains or transnational production and marketing
networks. Geographical proximity and free access to EU markets  for industrial products have
made them potentially attractive for transborder relocation of production. The existing evidence
suggests that  some CEECs have  become  part  of this  new  division  of  labor  resulting  from
participation  in  global  networks  of  production  and  distribution.  Estonian  and  Hungarian
producers in particular seem to have already become complements to EU-based production and
marketing networks. But the share of network-related trade in trade of other CEECs has been also
rapidly growing.
Incorporation of CEEC producers offers significant benefits to both CEECs and MNCs.
For the latter, it offers a wider menu of choices in their strategies to expand their position in
global markets. EU-based companies may thus become more competitive thanks to lower costs as
a result of moving some production fragments to CEECs. For the former, it yields even more
powerful advantages. Consider the following. First, it offers the chance of fast growth. The
experience of third-tier East Asian tigers suggests that integrating into production and marketing
networks of the MNCs offer the most efficient way to take advantage of growth opportunities
offered by the global economy (Zysman and Schwartz 1998, p.3).
Second, it locks them into the division of labor driven by technological advances with
large positive spillover effects and demonstration effects. New technologies have made possible
fragmentation of production process, that is, dividing the industry's value chain into smaller
29  The correlation between FDI inflows cumulative for 1993 and 1998 and the shares of network and other
parts trade in manufactured goods (excluding chemicals) is positive and relatively (0.68). Slovakia's
growth in this trade came mainly from automotive network organized around Volkswagen (Meyer
2000).38
functions that can be contracted out to suppliers located in different countries. Inclusion into the
production chain is usually accompanied by transfer of technology and managerial know how.
Third, it offers direct access to larger markets allowing exploiting economies of scale. It
boosts exports without firms incurring marketing costs and provides greater stability in earnings
thanks to a global reach of a "parent" company.
In all, expansion of network-driven trade contributes to boosting productivity in CEECs,
integrating their economies into global markets and also enhanced competitiveness of MNCs in
international markets.
3.4. Concluding comment
Turning to the question addressed in this section, one may conclude that the 'EU factor"
alone could not produce magic, especially during the early stages of the integration process. It is
rather the combination of the pace and scope of domestic liberalization,  the approach taken to
privatization of state-owned  assets and preferential  access to EU markets that together provides an
explanation. 3" The EU-sponsored integration  framework appears  to have played a significant role
but only for countries that early opted for bold and radical economic  reforms.
Geography and the approach taken to dismantling central planning have ultimately driven
FDI flows into CEECs. Countries that adopted a radical approach to economic reforrns, sustained
macroeconomic stability, opened all sectors of the economy to foreign participation and actively
sought foreign strategic partners in their privatization programs have been successful in attracting
FDI inflows.
But the EU-framework  has helped. Leaving aside wages and productivity, liberalization of
access to EU markets as stipulated in the trade component of the EA has increased attractiveness  of
CEEC to foreign investors. Investors from outside the EU would find location in CEEC as useful to
overcome trade barriers in the EU, whereas EU-based firms might then consider moving the
production from the EU without fear of deterioration in the conditions of access to their home
markets. They both would take advantage of emerging economies of scale thanks to unfettered
access to large markets in the EU.
3 0 For instance,  Bulgaria  received  very  little  FDI over 1989-96.  Following  the change  in government  and
introduction of stabilization-cum-transfornation program in 1997, the aggregate value of FDI inflows
over 1997-99  was  almost  four times  larger  than the total for 1989-96.  It seems  to confirm  that
government  comnmitment  to economic  reformns  combined  with  the EU-integrationist  framework
produces  synergy  in terms of attracting  FDI.  The EU framework  for integrating  CEEC  alone  would
not suffice.39
Conclusion
The  empirical  evidence  examined  in this paper  provides  support  to the view  that the
policy-induced  integration  framework  has positively  influenced  developments  in foreign  trade  of
CEEC  and has contributed  to FDI inflows.  But its influence  is difficult,  if not impossible,  to
assess  quantitatively.  Too many  factors  have  played  a role and some developments  in foreign
trade and FDI would  have  occurred  independently  of preferences  offered  by the EU. Consider  the
following.  With  the collapse  of central  planning  and the Council  for Mutual  Economic
Assistance,  massive  reorientation  of trade  to the  EU-due  to its sheer size and geographical
proximity-has been  bound to occur  with or without  preferential  agreements.
So has the surge  in FDI inflows.  Note first that for all practical  purpose  CEEC  were
closed  to FDI inflows  before  the collapse  of central  planning.  Second,  the 1990s  witnessed  a
spectacular  increase  in FDI flows  to developing  countries.  Hence,  one might  argue  that even
without  the EU policy-induced  integration  FDI would  come  to CEEC.
Yet, some transition  economies  fared  better  than others  in terms  of both trade and FDI.
As a region,  CEECs  outperformed  all CIS  economies,  which,  in part, may be explained  by less
onerous  legacy  of socialist  misdevelopment  in CEECs  and  their geographical  proximity  to the EU
rather than  the EU-integration  process.  But economic  policies  mattered,  and these  have  been
influenced  by the  policy-induced  integration.
Consider first foreign trade institutions and policies. The policy-induced  integration
framework  compelled  CEEC  to liberalize  their foreign  trade regimes.  Although  CEEC  have  been
reluctant  to open  their markets  on a multilateral  basis (except  for Estonia),  regional  opening  has
produced  what now  amounts  to free trade  regime  for industrial  products.  The regime  is not
unilateral.  But past estimates  based on gravity  model  suggested  that current  preferential  partners
(without  any preferences)  should  account  for the  bulk (almost  70 percent) of trade of CEEC
(Winters  and Wang 1994).  One suspects  that this proportion  is higher  for manufactures.  Hence,
most of their trade  is subject  to free  trade  rules with all efficiency  and welfare  gains usually
associated  with free  trade. 3'
Economic  regime  friendly  to private  business  activity  is a necessary  condition  to attract
FDI. Governments  committed  to liberal  economic  reforms  would  probably  succeed  in developing
market-supporting  institutions  and attractive  investment  climate.  It would  also then succeed  to
attract  foreign  investors.  But the "EU-associate"  status  has increased  attractiveness  thanks  to
preferential  access  to EU markets  and enhanced  credibility  to stay reform  course.  With  access  to
3'  Had  CEEC  (excluding  a free-trading  Estonia)  adopted  EU  MFN  applied  tariffs  on industrial  products,
these  gains  would  have  been  larger  as  there  would  less  trade  diversion.40
EU markets, the size of a domestic market mattered less.  In addition, the overwhelming public
support in CEEC for accession to the EU has provided reformers with a weapon to persuade
investors that liberal reforms are firmly locked-in and to contain vested interest group opposed to
economic reforms.
The "EU factor" did not tip the balance of political forces in CEEC in favor of radical
(successful) economic reforms immediately in the aftermath of the collapse of central planning.
These produced-to  borrow Havrylyshyn and Wolfe (1999) distinction-virtuous  cycle of
economic change as opposed to vicious cycle generated by gradualism. Both radical reformers
and gradualists set their policy course prior and independently of the EA. Gradualists (e.g.,
Bulgaria and Romania over 1990-96) failed miserably to attract FDI and improve their foreign
trade performance. Major beneficiaries were fast and radical reformers.
Although the "EU factor" was not present in the choice of approach to economic reforms,
it has influenced subsequent developments. It eased the pain of transition thanks to preferential
conditions in access to EU markets. It has provided institutional guidance to the transition-
harmonization with the acquis has been the principle. Last but not least, it has provided
credibility to liberal reforms-an  important point to investors, foreign and domestic alike. This in
turn combined with preferential access to EU markets have attracted high quality FDI inflows.
The "EU factor" has been decisive in attracting FDI and consequently in shaping foreign
trade of CEEC. Foreign firms seem to have been contributed to the shift in CEEC exports to the
EU towards more advanced stages of production. They have been almost fully responsible for
integrating some CEEC firms into global networks of production and marketing. Here the
relationship is unambiguous. Those countries that attracted significant FDI inflows between 1990
and 1997 have been also among top performers in EU markets.
The process of European eastern enlargement initiated by the EA has led to significant
integration of CEEC into the EU and has produced significant benefits to its participants. The
CEEC, as a group, is now the second largest trading partner of the EU after the U.S., accounting
for around 10 percent of its total external trade of the EU. The share of the EU in CEEC
aggregate trade is around 60 percent. Except for Bulgaria, the share of this trade in other CEEC
bordering the EU is higher than the share for most EU members themselves!41
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